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PENGARUH KOMPETISI POLITIK TERHADAP PELUANG KETERLAMBATAN PENETAPAN APBD
Abstract
This study aims to find out how the effect of political competition, in this case the concentration of political parties and government fragmentation on the chances of regional budget delays. This study uses annual panel data from 509 local governments in the period 2009-2017 which is then analyzed with binary regression logistic. This study shows that political competition has an effect on the likelihood of delays in determining the APBD. From the aspect of concentration of political parties it is known that the higher the concentration of political parties in an area, will reduce the chance of delays in determining the APBD in the local government. Whereas the regional government which is divided government significantly increases the chances of delays in determining the APBD. This indicates that the APBD determination process cannot be separated from the political dynamics between the executive and legislative branches in the regions. This study recommends that the central government establish specific legislation regarding delays in the stipulation of the regional budget, which regulates checks and balances in the budgeting process in the regions, and establishes a firmer reward and punishment related to the timeliness of establishing the regional budget.
Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk mengetahui bagaimana pengaruh kompetisi politik, dalam hal ini konsentrasi partai politik dan fragmentasi pemerintahan terhadap peluang keterlambatan penetapan APBD.Penelitian ini dilatarbelakangioleh fluktuasi ketepatan waktu penetapan APBD oleh pemerintah daerah. Penelitian ini menggunakan data panel tahunan dari 509 pemerintah daerah dalam kurun waktu tahun 2009-2017 yang kemudian dianalisa dengan regresi logistik biner. Penelitian ini memperlihatkan bahwa kompetisi politik berpengaruh terhadap peluang keterlambatan penetapan APBD. Dari aspek konsentrasi partai politik diketahui bahwa semakin tinggi konsentrasi partai politik di suatu daerah, akan menurunkan peluang keterlambatan penetapan APBD pada pemerintah daerah tersebut. Sedangkan pemerintah daerah yang merupakan divided government secara signifikan meningkatkan peluang keterlambatan penetapan APBD. Hal ini mengindikasikan bahwa proses penetapan APBD tidak lepas dari dinamika politik antara eksekutif dan legislatif di daerah. Penelitian ini merekomendasikan kepada pemerintah pusat agar dapat membentuk perundang-undangan secara khusus mengenai keterlambatan penetapan APBD, yang mengatur mekanisme check and balances dalam proses penganggaran di daerah, serta menetapkan reward and punishment yang lebih tegas terkait ketepatan waktu penetapan APBD.
Kata Kunci : Kompetisi Politik, Keterlambatan APBD, Logistik Biner
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.47896/je.v23i2.181
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